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ilr. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE 
KNOXVILLE 
O.....CE 0 .. THE SECRETARY 
April 26, 1951 
C. Eo Brehm 
President 
lIne University of Tennessee 
Dear President Brehm: 
For your information, I am glvlng you a copy of Judge 
Robert L. Taylor's opinion in the case of Gene Intchell 
Gray et al vs. TIle University of Tennessee et ale This 
is the so-called "Negro Casell. 
At the moment, it appears that the special committee 
appointed by the Board at its meeting of December 4, 1950 
to employ counsel, etc. should meet with the attorneys and 
determine what further steps should be taken. 
Very truly yours, 
JPH:ebs 
Enclosure 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EA.STERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
Filed 
April 20, 1951 
GENE MITCHELL GHAY ET AL 
CIVIL NO. 1567vs~ 
lITJIVERSITY OF TEID1ESSEE ET AL 
This case was heard by a three-judge court on the record, 

briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties on 

plaintiffs I motion for s~~ary judgment in their favor under 

Rule 56 of the Federal Hules of Civil Procedure. 

In an opinion by Circuit Judge Miller, in which Chief 

District Judge Darr and District Judge T~lor of the Eastern 

District of Tennessee, concurred, the Court held that the issue 

. involved j.B alleged unjust discrimination against the plaintiffs 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States and not the consti ­
tutionality of the Tennessee statutes and constitutional provisions 
referred to in the complaint. Following this opinion and the 
order entered pursuant thereto, Judge Miller and Judee Darr 
withdrew from the case, which is now before this Court for 
decision on the motion o 
Plaintiffs Gray and Alexander have applied for admission 

to the Graduate School and plaintiffs Blakeney and Patterson 

have applied for admission to the College of Law, of the 

University of Tennessee. All admittedly are qualified for 

admission, except for the fact that they are negroes~ 

'The matter of their applications was referred by Universi ty 
authori ties to the Board of Trustees, who disposed of the 
matter by the following resol"J.tion: 
I'\\l'hereas, the Constitution and the statutes 
of the State of Tennessee expressly provide that 
there shall be segregation in the education of 
the races in schools and colleges in thG State 
and that a violatJion of the laws of the Stat.e in 
this regard subjects the violator to prosecution, 
conviction, and punishment ae therein provided; and, 
"Whereas, this Board is bound by the Consti tu­
tiona.l provision a'1d act.s referred to; 
IIBe it therefore resolved, that the applications 
by members of the Negro race for admission as 
students into The University of Tennessee be and the 
same are hereby denied o lf 
Following the indicated action by the Board of Trustees, 
plaintiffs filed their joint complaint for themselves and on 
behalf of all negro citizens similarly situated, praying for 
a temporary and, after hearing, a perma,ent order restraining 
the defendants from executing the exclusion order of the Board 
of Trustees aeainst the plaintiffs, or other negroes similarly 
situated, and from all action pursuant to the constitution and 
statutes of the Stat.e of Tennessee, and the custom or usage 
of the defendants, respecting the requirement of segregation 
of whites and negroes in state·~supported educational 
institutions and exclusion of negroes from the Universit,y of 
Tennessee, their references being to Article 11, sec. 12, of 
the state constitution, to sections 2403.1, 240) .3, 11395, 
11396, ~,d 11397 of the Tennessee Code, and the custom and 
usage of defendants of excluding negroes from all colleges, 
schools, departments, and divisions of the University of 
Tennessee, including the Graduate School and the College of Law. 
Defenses interposed are nine in number, but in substance 
they are these: That defendants, in rejecting the applications 
of the plaintiffs, were and are obeJ~ngthe mandates of the 
segregation provisions of the constitution and laws of the 
State of Tennessee; that those provisions are in exercise of 
the police powers reserved to the states and are valid, the 
Fourteenth Amendment and laws enacted thereunder to the 
contrary notwithstanding, and that these plaintiffs have no 
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faciliti.es 
standing to bring this action for the reason that they have 
not exhaunted their administr3.tivo remedies under tho e'luivalent 
act of 191+1, Code section 2403.3. The plaintiffs, 
nfter alleging in their complaint that the University of 
Tennessee maintains a Graduate School and a College of Law 
which offer to whi te students the cou.rses sought by plaintiffs, 
make the follotdng specific allegation, which defendants, for 
failure to deny, adrnit: liThers is no other in9ti tution 
maintained or operated by the State of Tennessee at uhich 
plaintiffs might obtain the graduate anQ/or legal education 
for which they respectively have applied to The University of 
tlTennessee o 
It is, of course, recognized that the Constitution of 
the United States is one of enumerated and delegated powers. 
To remove original doubt as to the character of federal powers, 
the states adopted the Tenth Amendment, which provides: tiThe 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States;. are rf;served to the States 
respecti-:ely" or to the peopleo" The Con3titution contains 
no specific delegation of police powers, and those powers 
are accordingly reserv-edo But a glance discloses that, in 
re1ation to the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution contains 
two groups of powers, namely, the previously-delegated powers 
and the subsequently··delegated powers 0 By ac.option of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, folloYing adoption of the Tenth &~endment, 
the states consented to limitations upon their reserved powers, 
particularly in the following respects: 
lio State shall make or enforce a1 y law which shall 
abridge the privileges or i~~unities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, .without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection 'of the laws. . . . 
• • 0 
" 
It is recognized that "the police power of a state 
extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the 
duty, within constitutional limitations) to protect. the well-being 
and tranquility of a community. If Kovacs v .. Cooper" 336 U. s. 
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77 ~ 83(1 (Italics s11pplied). States "have power to legislate 
against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal 
corrunercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not 
--~ 
~ afoul of ~ specifi£ ~titutional p~ohibition, £! of 
!3~ valid federal l~ .. :! 'liJhi taker v" North CarolinaJ 335 U.S. 
525, 536!:' (Italics supplied).. In the foregoing quotations, 
the italicized portions poir~t up the limitation upon the 
exercise of a state's police powers. 
Segregation by law may, in a given situation, be a valid 
exercise of the state1s police powerso It has been so recognized 
with respect to schools. Gong Lum et al v. Rice et al, 275 
u.s. 78. Also, as to segregation on intrastate trains. Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.s~ 5370 But where enforcement by the state of 
a law ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying members 
of a particular race or nat~onality equal rights as to property 
or the equal protection of the laws, the state action has been 
condemned. This was the result where state law discriminated 
against aliens as to the privilege of employment. Truax v. 
Raich, 239 U.S .. 33" The same result was reached as to 
enforcement of restrictive covenants in deeds, Shelley et ux: 
v. Kraemer et ux, 334 U~S. 1; in the housing segregation cases, 
Richmond v. Deans~ 4 Circ. 37 F.2d 712, affirmed 281 U.S. 704; 
Buchanan v. \larley, 245 U So 60: and in thE' cases where(I 
segregation has resulted in inequality of educational 
opportunities for negroes, Sweatt v. Painter et aI, 339 u.S. 
629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S" 637. From 
these cases it appears to be well settled that exercise of the 
state's police powers ceases to be valid when it violates 
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defense 
on this ground, therefore, falls. 
The second question is whether the plaintiffs have 
present standing to bring this action. To understand the 
defense interposed here, it is desirable to look at the 
historical background of the act of 1941, of which the Court 
takes judicial notice o 
;..; , 
On October 18, 1939, six negroes applied for admission 
to the University of Tennessee, four to the Graduate Department 
and tl.fO to the College of Law. Being denied admission, they 
filed their separate petitions for mandamus in the Chancery 
Court of Knox County, Tennessee, to require their admissionc 
Following denial of the petitions in a consolidated proceeding, 
an 	appeal V'las taken to the .supreme Court of Tennessee,~"lhere 
the 	action of the Chancellor was affirmed by opinion filed 
November 7, 1942. State ex reI. Michael et al v. Witham et aI, 
179 	Tenno 250. The Case was not disposed of by the Chancellor 
on 	its merits, but on the ground that it had become moot" Vvhi.le 
• 	 the case was pending in the Chancer,y Court, the state legislature 
enacted the act of 191.j.l, no,v carried in the Code as sec. 2403.3, 
and entitled, Educational facilities for negro citizens 
liThe state board of education and the com­
missioner of education are hereby authorized 
and directed to provide educational training 
and instruction for ne~ro citizens of Tennessee 
equivalent to that provided at the University 
of Tennessee by the 3tate of Tennessee for white 
citizens of Tennessee. Such training and 
instruction shall be made av~ilable in a manner 
to be prescribed by the state board of education 
and the commissioner of education; provided, that 
members of the negro race and white race shall 
not attend the same institution or place of 
learning. The facilities of the Agricultural 
and Industrial State College, and other institu­
tions located in Tennessee, may b(~ used when 
deemed advisable by the state board of education 
and the commissioner of education, insofar as 
the facilities of same are adequate. 1I 
FolloWing enactment of the statute a supplemental answer was 
filed in the case then pending, in which it was averred that 
pursuant to the Act certain committees had been appointed by 
the 	state board of. education, with instructions to report at 
the board1s next regular meeting, an averment which suggested 
that the act of 1941 Was to be made operative expeditiously_ 
The 	 Supreme Court of Tennessee, in affirming the 
Chancellor's dismissal of the consolidated case, construed 
the 	act of 1941 to be mandatory in character. "No discretion 
w'hatever is vested in 'che State Board of Education under the 
Act as to the performance of its mandates. The manner of 
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providing educational training and instruction for negro 
citizens equivalent to that prov"ided for white citizens at the 
University of Tennessee is for the Board of Education to 
determine in its sound discretion, but the furnishing of such 
equivalent instruction is mandatory.1i State ex reI. Michael 
et al v. ~jitham et aI, 179 Tenn. 250.t 257. 
The court also said at page 257~ nUpon the demand of 
a negro upon the State Board of Education for training and 
instruction in any branch of learning taught in the University 
of Tennessee, it is the duty of the Board to provide such negro 
with equal facilities of instruction in such subjects as that 
enjoyed by the students of the University of Tennessee. The 
State Board of Education is entitled to reasonable advance 
notice of the intention of a negro student to require such 
facilities. No such advance notice by appellants is0 •• 
shown in the record." 
At page 258, th9 court further said: "It does not 
appear that the State Board of Education is seeking in any way 
to evade ·the perfonnance of Ghe duties placed upon it by 
Chapter 43, Public Acts 1941, or that it is lacking sufficient 
funds to carry out the purposes of the Act. The state having 
provided a full, adequate and complete method by w·hich negroes 
may obtain educational training and instruction equivalent to 
that provided at the University of Tennessee, a decision of 
the issues made in the consolidated causes becomes unnecessary 
and improper. The legislation of 1941 took no rights away 
from appellants; on the contraFJ the right to equality in 
education with white students WaS specifically recognized and 
the method by which thos e rights Nould be satisfied was set 
forth in the legislation. \That more could be demanded?" 






the allegations of the complaint, defendants admit that the 
directive, thou~;h mandatory, has not been carried outo 
Nevertheless, it is urged by defendants that these plaintiffs 
. have no standing here until they have petitioned the state 
board of education to furnish the equivalent educational 
training and instruction for negroes provided for by the act. 
The Supreme Court of the state noted in its opinion that the 
then applicants for admission to the University of Tennessee 
had given to the state board uno such advance notice" of a desire 
to be furnished facilities under the act. That omission is 
understandable here for the reason that their applications for 
admission to the University of Tennessee had not been finally 
disposed of by the courts, and the need of their applying to 
the state board had not been established. 
Since the enactrnen t of the Act of 1941 and the decision in 
State ex rel. Michael et al v. 'dtham et al, 179 Tenn. 250, the 
Supreme Court of the United 3tates has emphasized the pronounce­
ment of one of its older cases as to a particular element of 
equal protection. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U.3. 337, it appeared that Lincoln University, ·a state-supDorted 
school for negroes, intended to establish a law school. As to 
this intention the court said: If ••• it cannot be said that a 
mere declaration of purpose, still unfulfilled, is enough. 1f 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 346. In the 
same Case, at r.a ge 351, the court said: IfHere , petitioner IS 
right was a personal one. It was as an individual that he WaS 
entitled to the equal protection of the laWS, and the State 
was bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for 
legal education substantially equal to those which the State 
there afforded for persons of the'v{hite race, ••• " Later 
declarations indicate that the two quotations should be read 
together and that '.;.rhen so read they state the requirement of 
equality of op~ortunity to be personal and immediate. 
In Fisher v. Hurst, 333 u.S. 147, the court emphasized 

its pOSition that equality of opportunity in education means 

present equality, not the promise of future equality. This 





~.r~eCiSiOIl' "here the court said: "The State must 
/~ 
provide it for her in conformity with the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as 
it does for applicants of any other group. If Sipuel v. Board 
of ltegents of the Univarsity of Oklahoma et aI, 332 U. 3. 631. 
In the holding in McLaurin Va Oklahoma State Regents, 339 u.s. 
637, 642, the court said~ I!.Je conclude that the conditions under 
which this appellant is required to receive his education 
deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal 
protection of the laws ~ I! That equality of educational 
opnortunity for negroes means present equality was emphasized 
once more in d.'matt v. Paint.er at aI, 339 u.s. 629, 635: "Thls 
Court has stated unanimously that 'The State must provide 
(legal education) for (petitioner) in conformity with the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it 
as soon as it does for applicants of any other group f • Sipuel 
v. Board of Regents, 332 u.s. 631, 6330 fl In view of these recent 
declarations of the Supreme Court of the United 3tates, this Court 
is forced to conclude that the defense of exhaustion of administra­
tiv~ remedies fails. 
The Court finds that under the Gaines, Sipuel, ~weatt and 
McLaurin cases heretofore cited, these plaintiffs are being denied 
their ri~t to the equal protection of the laws as provided by the 
~:~ Fourteenth Amendment and holds that under the decisions of the 
~~~ suprem.e Court the plaintiffs are be arn:~~~~~~:2~_entitled to 
. &4..,~ 
Y ~?~OO,ls~:...~~:~~~n!'~,:E_,~.i.:~.,.~E,,::',~~,~~::;_, to which they have .~?p~~~d 
for admission. 'Believing that the Universi ty authorities iiill 
either comply with the lai'l as herein declared or take the case up 
on appeal, th~ Court does not deem an injunctive order presently 
to be appropriate. The case, hOYvever, will be retained on the 
docket for such orders as may seem proper when it appears that 
the applicable law has been finally declared. 
ROBT. L. TAYltOR 
United States ~istrict Judge 
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